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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
LOUIS Vi/. BONNY, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
12087 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, wherein appellant was found guilty of Escape 
from the Utah State Prison. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District, in 
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Aldon J. Ander-
son, presiding, denied appellant's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction, whereupon the 
case was tried on stipulated facts without a jury. Appellant 
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was found guilty of the crime of Escape, and was sentenced 
as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent is in agreement with the Statement of 
Facts as set forth in appellant's brief with the following 
additions and clarifications. 
At arraignment on January 26, 1970, the prosecuting 
attorney requested that the case be set for trial on January 
28, 1970, which date was within ninety days from the day 
appellant requested final disposition of the matter pending 
·against him. 
Defense counsel was unable to accept the suggested 
date. Upon inquiry by the court as to when the next most 
available time was, both attorneys indicated that the 9th 
of February, 1970, was alright. The court then ruled that 
the matter "[m]ay be set for the 9th of February." (Ar-
raignment T. 3). 
Thus, prosecutor did request a trial date, which date 
was within the ninety day period. Defense counsel was not 
able to accept the date. The court, with the approval of 
both defense counsel and prosecutor, set the trial for Feb-
ruary 9, 1970, which date was only five days beyond the 
ninety day period. 
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THE TRIAL COURT HAD .JUlUSDlCTION BE-
YOND NJNETY DAYS. FROM FILING OF RE-
QUEST FOR FINAL DISPOSITION AND DID 
NOT ERR IN CONVICTING AND SENTENC-
ING APPELLANT, IN THAT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-1 (SUPP. 1969), 
THE COURT GRANTED A NECESSARY AND 
REASONABLE CONTINUANCE FOR GOOD 
CAUSE. 
The issue in case at bar falls within the Utah Detainer 
Act which provides in part: 
"Whenever a person has entered upon a term 
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institu-
tion of this state, and whenever during the continu-
ance of the term of imprisonment there is pending 
in this state any untried indictment, information or 
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought 
to trial within ninety days after he shall have cau.sed 
to be delivered to the. county attorney of the cou:p.ty 
in which the indictment, information or complaint 
is pending and the appropriate court written notice 
of the place of his imprisonment and his request for 
a final. disposition to be made of the. indictment, 
information or complaint: pro,vided, that for a g<;>od 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his coun-
sel being present, the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter may ora11t any riece.ssm·y or 1·easonable 
continuance . ... " Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-1 (a) 
(Supp. 1969). (Emphasis added.) 
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"In the event that the action is not brought to 
trial within the period of time as herein provided, 
no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdic-
tion thereof, nor shall the untried indictment, in-
formation or complaint be of any further force or 
effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing 
the same with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
65-2 (Supp. 1969). 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that the legisla-
ture, by passing these statutes, intended to put the burden 
of compliance upon the prosecutor. State v. l-Vilson, 453 
P. 2d 158, 22 U. 2d 361 (1969). 
In case at bar, the prosecutor attempted at arraign-
ment to set the case for trial at a date within the ninety 
day limit, but defense counsel was not able to accept the 
date. The earliest date convenient for both attorneys was 
a date five days beyond the ninety day limit, but a date 
which the court established after hearing the requests and 
considering circumstances of both the defense counsel and 
the prosecutor. 
Respondent submits that the continuance to a date 
five days beyond the ninety day period was reasonable and 
necessary, and was based upon good cause shown in open 
court. Therefore, the facts are within the statutory provi-
sions allowing extension of time, and the court had j uris-
diction to try the matter 95 days after appellant"s request 
for final disposition. 
Appellant contends that the case at bar is on all fours 
with State v. Wilson, supra. (Appellant's Brief at 5.) The 
case at bar is not on all fours with Wilson, and is easily 
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distinguished in that in case at bar prosecutor requested 
that the case be set for trial at a date within the ninety 
day period; whereas, in "Wilson the prosecutor requested 
a date beyond the ninety day period. 
The purpose of the statute involved in case at bar, is 
"to more precise]y define what is meant by 'speedy trial' 
as that term is used in the constitutions of the various 
states." State v. Wilson, supra, at 363. 
The United States Supreme Court: 
'· ... has consistently been of the view that 
' [ t] he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. 
It is consistent with delays and depends upon cir-
cumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It 
does not preclude the rights of public justice.' [ ci-
tation omitted. J 'Whether delay in completing a 
prosecution ... amounts to an unconstitutional dep-
rivation of rights depends upon the circumstances 
... The de]ay must not be purposeful or oppressive.' 
[citation omitted.] '[T]he essential ingredient is 
orderly expedition and not mere speed.'" United 
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court 
concerning speedy trial may be applied to case at bar. Cir-
cumstances justified continuance; announcement by appel-
lant of his inability to accept prosecutor's original requested 
date for trial justified continuance to a reasonable date. 
No rights of appellant were prejudiced. The de]ay was not 
purposeful or oppressive. There was orderly expedition. 
The court's decision to set the date five days beyond the 
ninety day period was reasonauly made and was in com-
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:r~liance with the appropriate statute. The facts fall well 
\\rithin the constitutional standard of right to a speedy trial, 
the Utah statute, and do not fall contrary to Utah case law. 
The continuance granted in case at bar resulted in no 
prejudice to appellant, and vrns not an abuse of the court's 
discretion. 
Where arraignment proceedings were conducted within 
the ninety day period and prosecution attorney attempted to 
set trial date within the ninety day period, but flefense coun-
s.el was unable to accept suggested date, the court was acting 
well wjthin the statutory limits in setting the date for trial 
five days beyond the ninety day limit, because no earlier 
date was convenient to both attorneys. 
Furthermore, the ·above argument is based upon the 
assumption that the ninety day period began running on 
.November 6, 1969, "vhen an agent of Utah State Prison 
received notice and request for disposition " of pending 
charges. According to the decision of a recent· Utah case, 
request is premature if it i~ submitted prior to time infor-
mation is filed. State of Utah v. Belcher, Case No. 12077, 
filed September 29, 1970. The information in case at bar 
was filed January 23, 1970, and trial was held February 9, 
1970. Therefore, trial was within the ninety day period. 
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CONCLUSION 
The continuance was granted pursuant to the statute. 
The court had jurisdiction at the time it passed judgment 
upon appellant. The respondent submits that neither appel-
lant's statutory or constitutional rights were violated, and 
therefore, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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